Grand Valley Journal of History
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 2

2017

Civil War or Genocide? The United Nations Commission of
Experts’ Misunderstanding of the Third Balkan War of the 1990s
Matthew G. Morley
DePaul University, matthewgmorley@gmail.com

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Human Rights Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Political History Commons

Recommended Citation
Morley, Matthew G. (2017) "Civil War or Genocide? The United Nations Commission of Experts’
Misunderstanding of the Third Balkan War of the 1990s," Grand Valley Journal of History: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol4/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Grand Valley Journal of History by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gvsu.edu.

Civil War or Genocide? The United Nations Commission of Experts’
Misunderstanding of the Third Balkan War of the 1990s
Cover Page Footnote
My sincerest thanks goes to Dr. Julia Woesthoff, History Department DePaul University for guidance in
writing the first draft of this article; to Dr. James Krokar, Professor Emeritus History Department DePaul
University for reviewing this article and for advancing my understanding of Balkans history; and last but
not least to the staff of DePaul University's Special Collections and Archives department.

This article is available in Grand Valley Journal of History: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol4/iss2/2

Morley: Genocide or Civil War?

Civil War or Genocide?
The United Nations Commission of Experts’ Misunderstanding of the Third
Balkan War of the 1990s

In July 1989, Robert Kaplan, a journalist for The Atlantic, analyzed and
wrote on the economic and social unrest taking place in the Balkans, and
commented on the worsening conditions within the Federal Socialist Republic of
Yugoslavia. He began his article with a broad, misinformed statement about the
geneses of Balkan present-day conflicts: “The violence of the twentieth century
has derived in large measure from the ethnic hatreds of the Balkans.”1 In the
months that followed, the term “age-old hatreds” became a common description
for the relationship between the nations of the Yugoslavia, especially after
catastrophic dissolution in 1992. Coinciding with other geopolitical shifts in
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to the crumbling Soviet bloc,
members of the Slovene, Croat, Bosnian, and Kosovar intelligentsias advocated for
greater autonomy and federal decentralization for a variety of purposes: republicbased educational systems independent of federal curricula and standards,
modernization (i.e. political reform), market mechanisms, and other freedoms
comparable to the capitalist economics of European Community and the United

1

Robert D. Kaplan, “Europe’s Third World,” TheAtlantic.com, (originally published July 1989)
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/unbound/flashbks/balkans/kaplanf.htm. For more on Kaplan’s
influence see John B. Allcock, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”
In Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, ed. Charles Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, 346-389
(Washington D.C.: Purdue University Press, 2009).
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States.2 The resulting responses from Serbs and the Serb-dominated federal state
were to maintain the federal government’s power and later to exchange
populations, eventually graduating from economic disagreements to nationalist
rhetoric intended to preserve Serbian national unity. Journalists and news reporters
observing the escalating tensions agreed with and repeated Kaplan’s claims, and
scathing documentaries and journalistic pieces covering the dire conditions of the
war-torn country prompted the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping and
military efforts.3
An ad hoc committee, the United Nations Commission of Experts, was
formed for the purpose of investigating the violations of human rights – including
ethnic cleansing, widespread war rape, mass unmarked graves, concentration
facilities, as well as military and paramilitary forces targeting civilians, women,

2

Kosovo was the epicenter for this disruptive infusion of economics and nationalism; as more
(Muslim) Albanians migrated to Kosovo – and as more autonomy was awarded to the Yugoslav
republics – many Serb intellectual and political leaders grew concerned of the growing economic
arguments for Kosovo’s independence and other decentralizing policies aimed to weaken federal
power, which would in turn scatter the Serb nation across many states. What originated as
decentralization and economic gains among non-Serbs led to xenophobia and nationalist goals
among Serbs. For more on the Yugoslav Communist Party’s decentralization as precursor to the
conflict see Dejan Jović, “Yugoslavism and Yugoslav Communism: From Tito to Kardelj,” in
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992, ed. Dejan Djokić (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 2003), 157-81. For more on the non-Serb political annunciations of autonomy
and market westernization in Yugoslavia, see Jasna Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation’,
Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 2002). For more on Slovenian dissention at the federal level, especially
regarding the Yugoslav Writers’ Union, see Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Intellectuals and the Collapse
of Yugoslavia: The End of the Yugoslav Writers’ Union” in Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed
Idea, 1918-1992, ed. Dejan Djokić (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 283.
3

See, for example, one of the earliest and most popular journalistic works on the Third Balkan
War: Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillin Publishing Company, 1993).
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and children – that were taking place in the former Yugoslavia.4 The reports of the
Commission of Experts were involved in the UN Security Council’s decisionmaking process, as evidenced by the Security Council’s adoption of the
Commission’s recommendation to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia in 1993. The Commission’s research reports and
investigations tended to repeat essentialist notions of ethnic incompatibilities
promulgated largely by Serb nationalists. These essentialist notions reinforced a
belief about the futility of intervention because they misguided the Commission’s
writings on the genesis of the conflict. Given that the Commission misunderstood
how the war erupted, their reports conflated elements of civil war with elements of
genocide, and the UN Security Council – which reviewed and consulted the
Commission’s findings – was provided unclear descriptions of the conflict and
how it began, and consequently, how it should be addressed.
By treating the region’s massacres of the Second World War as evidence
of inherent conflict, the Commission adopted and repeated Serbian national myths,
and therefore the Commission presented an image of the South Slavs as violently
fratricidal (between civil war and genocide). This juxtaposition between World
War II and the Third Balkan War would have also perhaps given rise to onlookers’
4

“United Nations Commission of Experts, Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former
Yugoslavia;” M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports and Data
Submitted To The Commission Between November 3-25, 1992, M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers,
DePaul University Special Collections and Archives, DePaul University, Chicago IL (hereafter:
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers).
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hopes that resolution among South Slavs would present itself just as it had in the
country’s recent past.5 This is the greatest misunderstanding repeated by the
Commission: in accepting Serbian national myths as fact, the Commission
validated Serbian nationalist rhetoric. The Commission did not investigate how
and why Serbian scholars and politicians presented this rhetoric, and therefore, the
Commission (mis)understood the conflict by keeping their perspective within the
evidential framework presented by Serb nationalists. In essence, Serb nationalists
constructed and presented the war of the 1990s as an iteration of the war of the
1940s, not only to combat propositions of economic freedoms, but also to preserve
Serbian national unity. This reaction came about during the 1980s, when
Albanians, Serbs, and Slovenes debated questions about Kosovo’s (and other
republic’s) independence and sovereignty.6 An investigation of this particular issue
– how the Kosovo question was deliberated during the 1980s – would have
revealed

the

federal

administrative

issues

in

balancing

socialist

decentralization/democratization with nationalist programs for independence.7
Within this nexus of issues arose further questions of how to address sovereignty,
national rights, democracy, and cultural genocide – all ideas that the UN would
5

Given that the conflict of the 1940s had been resolved by the re-founding of Yugoslavia in 1945
by the Partisan socialists, comparisons between the 1940s and the 1990s conflicts would perhaps
have conflated the likelihood of another political resolution, or support the appearance of “history
repeating itself.”
6

Tea Sindbæk, Usable History? Representations of Yugoslavia’s Difficult Past from 1945-2002
(Copenhagen: Aarhaus University Press, 2012), 139-88.
7

See Dragović-Soso,‘Saviours of the Nation,’ 115-45.
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litigate and address in the next decade – though prior to any successful
intervention efforts. References to “ancient hatreds” or “age-long” disputes among
South Slavs were, therefore, loaded phrases intended to distract from the economic
reality and disparities among the Yugoslav republics; furthermore, the
Commission’s ignorance of the conflict’s genesis and their adoption of Serbianconstructed mytho-history was detrimental to peacekeeping efforts.
When members of the Commission shared their observations of the
conflict, they tended to feel the need to explain that the conflict was a longstanding one – “age-old.” This view of the conflict’s genesis was due to the
tremendous amount of evidence the Commission gathered and consulted: much of
the evidence was first-hand experiences and testimonies from victims and
aggressors, which often repeated a propagandized lexicon for describing the nature
of the conflict. In expressing lengthy, detailed histories of South Slav conflicts, the
Commission’s reports communicate the notion that the conflict was both a civil
war and also the result of ongoing ethnic incompatibilities. Because the
Commission portrayed the parties engaged in conflict in this way, their reports
provided a wealth of evidence supporting and recapitulating popular
misunderstandings (i.e. nationalist myths) about the Yugoslav conflict.8 It is
plausible that because the UN Security Council reviewed the Commission’s
8

The Commission provided several hundred pages of reports and histories of the conflict(s), in
addition to 65,000 pages of digital evidence, interviews, maps, and narratives stored and presented
to the Security Council and the ICTY.
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reports, members of the Security Council adopted the myth of the age-old hatreds.
Due to the armed conflicts emerging in other places of the world and requiring UN
and United States attention and vigilance (Somalia, Rwanda, Iraq, Kuwait, former
Soviet bloc countries, etc.), the Security Council may have viewed any UNsponsored attempt to intervene in an age-long war as futile – or perhaps
conveniently so. Since these reports informed military/peacekeeping action and
portrayed the conflict in distorted terms, and since the actions of the Security
Council in the years following the Commission’s Final Report are recorded in
great detail, it is plausible to suggest that the Security Council could not reconcile
the legal ideation and information presented by the Commission – in addition to
applying UN established principles uniformly.
The fairly ineffectual nature of various UN efforts throughout the former
Yugoslavia also suggests that the Commission’s reports did not expedite
intervention efforts and/or perhaps may have halted the Security Council from
further involvement. Though the Commission of Experts was determined to end
systematic exterminations, their misunderstandings of both the region’s history
and of the forces that led to inter-communal conflict allowed the Security Council
to stall additional intervention efforts. While the Security Council litigated
definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, conflicts of international or
internal nature, and dozens of UN principles and declarations, the conflict
continued to worsen until the United States spearheaded the NATO bombing of

https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol4/iss2/2
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regions occupied by the Yugoslav National Army and Bosnian Serb paramilitary
forces escalating in February 1994.9
Although the conflict was described as “age-old,” it was popularly
recognized as the Yugoslav civil war, which had also carried unintended
repercussions given the fact that it was presented alongside the ancient hatreds
narrative. Misunderstanding the conflict to be a civil war paralyzed intervention
efforts, because the parties that were engaged in conflict were discernable largely
along national fault lines. If the various national identities contained within the
umbrella identity of “Yugoslav” were essentially different, this meant that the
conflict between Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs was an example of what the UN
categorized as self-determination; evidenced by the immediate and widespread
recognition of statehood following Slovenia’s, Croatia’s, and Bosnia’s secessions
from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. When politicians, nongovernmental
organizations, and journalists misinterpreted histories of inter-communal violence
in the region, they agreed with prevailing assumptions and yet easily dismissed the
conflict by simultaneously identifying it as a civil war resulting from an imagined
lengthy history of constant civil war. The Security Council legitimized recognition
9

That is not to say that the NATO bombing was an appropriate means of action; despite the
devastation of many Serb paramilitary occupied zones, the NATO strikes turned the tide of
massacres, transferring the balance of power in the war torn former Yugoslavia from the Serb
paramilitary to Croatian and Bosnian forces (which began working together since the Serb
paramilitary and JNA greater outnumbered and outgunned bands of Croatian and Bosnian
citizens). Moreover, the NATO air raids alone were highly destructive and effective, having
devastating residual costs: casualties, broken urban infrastructure, and disconnected roadways,
which further disrupted military mobilization.
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of the conflict as civil war because Yugoslavia had more or less existed for the
entirety of the twentieth century, during which the populations had coexisted under
various regimes. Yet, since the warring populations broke along national barriers
(largely the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians) and for the purposes of creating new
national states uninhibited by a Yugoslav federation, the conflict was treated as
one of self-determination. As a conflict of self-determination, the UN had no
precedent for intervention – hence “self.”
This interpretation of the UN’s ideologically based response to the
Yugoslav conflict is not entirely new in scholarship. Rosalyn Higgins, a professor
of international law at the University of London, articulated the danger of treating
the conflict as civil war in an edited text of a speech she delivered at the eighteenth
Martin Wight Memorial Lecture at Sussex University.10 However, she delivered
her speech on March 1, 1993 – a year after Bosnia had declared independence – so
her account does not include an analysis of the UN’s treatment of the conflict as
civil war, because the conflict was still young. Political scientist Peter Alan Sproat
wrote a scathing analysis of the UN’s principle of self-determination, and he
claimed that UN charters ambiguously discuss the principle, which he believes
was responsible for the aggression and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.
While it is not the purpose of the present article to condemn the UN (as Sproat

10

Rosalyn Higgins, “The new United Nations and former Yugoslavia,” International Affairs 69,
no. 3 (1993): 465-83.
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explicitly states as one of his purposes), his perspective sheds light on the paradox
of self-determination and its application to the Third Balkan War.11 William
Maley, also a political scientist, addresses how the UN problematically applied
three UN principles – sovereignty of states, self-determination, and human rights –
when considering the best course of action.12
Though the aforementioned scholars have analyzed the UN and its
principles in relation to Yugoslavia, no historical account exists that analyzes the
reception of reports generated by the Commission of Experts Special Rapporteur
M. Cherif Bassiouni and the International Human Rights Law Institute, which
managed the research and investigations overseen by the Commission. However,
historian Jonathan May analyzed the underlying worldview that informed one
particular British politician, Jeremy “Paddy” John Durham Ashdown, who served
as the High Representative for Yugoslavia from 2002 to 2006. Like Bassiouni in
the present article, May selected Ashdown as the subject of his micro-historical
study because of Ashdown’s knowledge of political action during the Yugoslav
conflict. May demonstrates a shift in Ashdown’s worldviews and ultimately argues
that Ashdown subscribed to the “ancient hatreds” theory of Yugoslavia’s

11

Peter Alan Sproat, “The United Nations’ Encouragement of Aggression and Ethnic Cleansing:
Time to Abandon the Right to Self-Determination?” Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no. 1
(1996): 93-113.
12

William Maley, “The United Nations and Ethnic Conflict Management: Lessons from the
Disintegration of Yugoslavia,” Nationalities Papers 25, no. 3 (1997): 559-73.
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dissolution.13 An investigation of the Commission and their reports is invaluable
given the deficit of historical knowledge about the information and reportage
provided to and utilized by the UN Security Council.
When describing the nature of the Yugoslav conflict, Bassiouni and the
Commission adopted the idea of age-old hatreds – a concept based on essentialism.
According to this thinking, perpetual ethnic incompatibility legitimized the
conflict because the warring peoples each had a right to self-determination. When
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded from Yugoslavia, the UN
almost immediately recognized the statehood of each; but, when the Bosnian Serbs
basically utilized the same principle of self-determination when seceding from
newly independent Bosnia (under control of the Serb paramilitary) with intentions
of rejoining what was left of Yugoslavia (i.e. Greater Serbia), the conflict was
treated as a civil war. As a civil war of self-determination, the UN had no
precedent for intervention. Effectively, the Security Council was not able to
maneuver through all of the applicable UN principles established over decades by
UN charters and declarations.
The Serb nationalist narrative has since been discredited by experts in this
field, but not before it had a significant impact on the international reaction to the
conflict. Few scholars of Yugoslavia, if any, argue that the country’s dissolution

13

Jonathan May, “How Bosnia Changed Paddy,” East European Politics & Societies 27, no. 4
(November 2013): 593-618 http://eep.sagepub.com/content/27/4/593.
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was inevitable or that the South Slav populations have deep seeded hatreds toward
one another. Most scholars believe conflict between the nations of Yugoslavia in
the 1990s was solely a product of the twentieth century, which is to say the
country’s purpose for existence and what the country meant to each of these
nations were the only real sources of tension.14 For example, Yugoslav scholar
Bogdan Denitch states that aside from “communal massacres of Serbs by Croatian
fascist Ustaša and massacres of Muslims and Croats by Serbian Chetniks during
the Second World War, Serbs and Croats have lived together more or less
tolerably for four centuries.”15
Months after Kaplan’s article in The Atlantic, many of Kaplan’s predictions
about the political dissolution of Yugoslavia matched the realities of the country.
Decadal constitutional concessions since the 1950s provided greater autonomy to
the

Yugoslav

republics

(Slovenia,

Croatia,

Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Serbia,

Montenegro, and Macedonia) and this decentralization weakened the federal
power and influence of Yugoslavia. Competing interpretations of the Yugoslav
national identity surfaced in elite political discussions from the early 1960s
14

Originally named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the country was renamed the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (literally, “Land of the South Slavs”) in 1929 in order to promote cultural
integration, but over the course of the twentieth century, identity discussions on what constitutes
“South Slav” and which populations (should) belong to the country bore sociopolitical importance.
15

Denitch, op. cit., 62. Scholars using a variety of approaches agree: Dragović-Soso analyzes the
development of twentieth-century Serbian intellectuals, Dragović-Soso, op. cit.; Wachtel uses
popular print culture to understand changing constructions of national identity, Wachtel, op. cit.;
and historian Tia Sindbæk comes to similar conclusions in her historiographical review of
Yugoslav scholars writing on the genocide that occurred during the Second World War, Tia
Sindbæk, op. cit.
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through the late 1980s, which fuelled these constitutional concessions.16 Shortly
thereafter, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia seceded from
the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The secessions of Croatia and
Bosnia prompted a full-scale military response by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav
National Army in order to protect the national unity of the Serb nation by
preserving a single state in which all Serbs lived. Bosnia was the last of the three
republics to secede, declaring independence in March 1992. With the secession of
Bosnia, Croatian militias, Bosnian civilians, and Serbian paramilitary forces
erupted in conflict, each fighting the other two. Nonstandard soldiers from each of
these nations began committing atrocities; quickly after the conflict began,
Radovan Karadzić, the President of the newly founded Republika Srpska – a
region controlled by Bosnian Serb rebels – encouraged a policy of “ethnic
cleansing,” a euphemism to disguise a gravely nationalist genocidal movement
largely executed by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. The United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights (UNCHR), and various European countries sent UN troops into Bosnia and
Croatia, but these efforts were inadequate in stopping the rampant violations of
16

Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in
Yugoslavia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 130. Wachtel, a literary historian, traces
the cultural contours and complex conceptions of Yugoslavism beginning with the turn of the
twentieth century. He argues that Yugoslavism changed multiple times since the creation of the
“first Yugoslavia” (1918-1941). Coinciding with the constitutional concessions of 1965 and 1974,
Yugoslavism was reinterpreted as “multinational Yugoslavism,” allowing for local identities to be
expressed. When these local identities came into conflict, the political sphere fractured along
ethnic boundaries, and when the western republics seceded, the country dissolved.
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human rights.17 Although almost every scholar of Yugoslavia would agree that the
country dissolved for complex reasons and motives that were legitimized by
imagined national histories, that is exactly how Cherif Bassiouni and other
members of the Commission of Experts understood and portrayed the genesis of
the ethnic conflict: as the result of primordial hatreds.
For the nineteen months that the Commission of Experts existed, the group
was limited in UN-sponsored resources and therefore had to operate efficiently and
independently (i.e. privately). When the Commission was established in October
1992, the United Nations Security Council appointed as Chairman of the
Commission Frits Kalshoven, Professor of International Humanitarian Law at
Leiden University (Netherlands), but less than a year later, Kalshoven resigned due
to medical and personal reasons. Until his resignation, DePaul University Law
Professor and world-renowned expert of international law, Cherif Bassiouni, had
served as Special Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of Facts, and in Fall
1993 Bassiouni was made Chairman in Kalshoven’s absence.18 As one of the
central founding members of the newly formed International Human Rights Law
Institute (IHRLI) at DePaul University School of Law, Bassiouni utilized the legal

17

Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia, Revised Edition
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 206-7.
18

The United Nations Commission of Experts, Final Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf, 7-8, 10.
(hereafter: Final Report of the Commission of Experts).
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and research capabilities of the IHRLI when conducting research for the
Commission. Additionally, the Commission was provided a severely limited
budget, which prompted Bassiouni and IHRLI staff members to pursue $800,000
(USD) in private funding for investigative trips to the former Yugoslavia: “In less
than eight months, from July 1993 to March 1994, the Commission undertook
thirty-five field missions, conducted several extensive investigations, gathered a
large amount of evidence and information, and produced several major reports –
all of which constitutes a starting point for the Prosecutor of the ICTFY.”19
Bassiouni’s efforts were integral to the UN Security Council’s decision-making
process vis-à-vis IHRLI-supported Commission status reports on the former
Yugoslavia. Because Bassiouni was a central member of both the IHRLI and the
Commission of Experts, his papers provide insight to the inner concepts that the
groups and its members interacted with and reconciled. The majority of the
sources interrogated herein were thus gathered from the M. Cherif Bassiouni
Papers at DePaul University’s Special Collections and Archives, and most of these
sources are administrative/legal documents with few exceptions: articles and
letters mostly composed by Bassiouni.

19

The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1993, Human rights II – Cherif Bassiouni
condemns ‘psychology’ of Balkan crimes, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers; and M. Cherif
Bassiouni, 1994, The United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. Over the course of their
involvement with the Commission of Experts, the IHRLI contributed over one million US dollars;
Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 9.
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Perhaps the most informative experience Bassiouni had while managing
the investigation of war crimes occurred in 1993, during a four-day trip to
Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.20 While driving outside the city limits of
Pale in an armored personnel carrier (APC), Bassiouni, William Fenrick (another
member of the Commission of Experts), and their UN escorts were stopped when a
Renault containing a Bosnian Serb paramilitary crashed into the side of the APC.
More paramilitary arrived from the headquarters located up the road from the
accident, and Bassiouni engaged in conversation with one English-speaking
commander that had come to the scene. Bassiouni recalls in a letter shortly after
the dangerous incident:
During the long discussion I had with the unit “commander,” he made the
case that the Croatians [sic.] were the “aggressors” against the Serbs, that
the Serbs had been victimized so long by the Croats (particularly during
WW II) and by the Muslims (particularly during the Ottoman occupation)
and that what they (the Serbs) were doing to the Croats and to the BosnianMuslims was justifiable because they were defending themselves or
exacting revenge, ultimately only trying to regain the territory they
believed was theirs.21
Bassiouni repeated two prominent Serbian national myths: (1) recurrent Serb
victimization by Muslim populations since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389
(“particularly during the Ottoman occupation”); and (2) that Serbs were the sole
20

It was informative because Bassiouni references this trip in an article he wrote: M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Christian Science Monitor, 1993, An Argument for Peace at Serbian Checkpoint,
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. He also explains the trip in great detail in a letter to a member of
the IHRLI: M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers. And
lastly, Bassiouni recalls the trip in court: United States District Court, Southern District of New
York, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić court transcription, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers.
21
M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers.

Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 2015

15

Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 2

victims of genocide during the Second World War.22 This reporting does not prove
Bassiouni bore a view of essentialism. It could mean just that: Bassiouni reporting
on what basis Serb paramilitary legitimized their military actions in Bosnia and
Croatia. Except, Bassiouni states in his letter to Julio Baez that the commander
was “a graduate of Sarajevo University in history and had travelled abroad,” and in
an article Bassiouni authored in The Christian Science Monitor, Bassiouni
identifies the man as “[a]n English-speaking militiaman, a Serbian university
graduate.”23 It is significant that Bassiouni portrays this commander as educated
because Bassiouni viewed him as having some degree of intellectual authority, and
Bassiouni incorporated the experience into his understanding of the conflict.
Bassiouni eventually retold the story of being seized outside of Pale while
on his four-day trip to Bosnia, but this time instead of writing an article or a letter,
Bassiouni was expert witness to the defense in Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić:
And if you forgive me just a little [anecdote], when I was seized by a group
of militiamen outside Pale and held there for a while I sort of engaged them
in conversation […] and one of them came up and in broken English and
said, remember the Battle of Kosovo, and I said, this was 1398 [sic.] and he
said, no, no, no, this is today. And whether it’s by belief or not, the point is

22

For more on the national myth of Serb victimization and the Battle of Kosovo, see Denitch, 72,
and Wachtel, 197-219. For more on the thematization of Second World War genocide perpetrated
against Serbs, especially in Serbian scholarship, see Sindbæk, 155.
23

M. Cherif Bassiouni to Julio A. Baez, 1993, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers; and M. Cherif
Bassiouni, The Christian Science Monitor, 1993, An Argument for Peace at Serbian Checkpoint,
The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers.
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that many of these things are still extremely present in the minds of
people.24
Seven years after the conversation with the paramilitary commander, Bassiouni
was still citing the experience, but he no longer referred to the commander as
educated – as a university graduate – like before. In the years that had elapsed,
Bassiouni became more critical of the commander’s words and portrayed him as
less intelligible than in Bassiouni’s previous iterations of the encounter, likely
because he could scrutinize the source based on his experiences and research. But
by the time the trial convened in 2000, Bassiouni had already substantially
incorporated the commander’s words – Serbian nationalist myths – into the reports
he had written for review by the UN Security Council.
Greater digital and communications technology promulgated media
coverage of the war in Bosnia and had great political influence because the media
climate of the early 1990s was overloaded with images and reports of detention
camps, mass graves, besieged cities, and battles between the Yugoslav populations
and UN forces. Journalist pieces by Roy Gutman, Ed Vulliamy, John Burns, Penny
Marshall, and Maggie O’Kane, for example, all contributed dramatically to the
shift in public concern for the war in Bosnia.25 At the same time that these media
sources called for greater global attention to the Balkans crisis, many sources
24

United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić
court transcription, 2000, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 32, emphasis added.
25

Allcock, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, 357.
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repeated Kaplan’s claim that the conflicts were due to innate ethnic hatreds.
Because of the availability of media resources, one of the first major reports of the
UN Commission of Experts was produced months after the establishment of the
Commission in 1992. In preparation for the report, Bassiouni and two IHRLI
research assistants analyzed hundreds of reports collected by the UNPROFOR, the
UNHCR, nongovernmental organizations, and news accounts on the Yugoslav
conflict, producing a single, compiled report of their findings. This report is
significant because: (1) Bassiouni based his general conclusions on highly detailed
examinations of potentially ahistorical claims; and (2) given the meticulousness of
the report, the UN Security Council enacted some of the recommendations
outlined. There are five major conclusions:
[1] Most of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and in particular
Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the scene of massive and systematic violations of
human rights as well as grave violations of humanitarian law. [2] Human
rights violations are being perpetrated by all parties to the conflict [3] Acts
of violence are supported and encouraged by those in power. [4] The
situation of those detained in camps is dramatic. [5] UNPROFOR and
UNHCR cannot adequately protect the affected populations and cannot
prevent violations of human rights.26
Again, the Security Council was informed that all parties were committing
violations, which could appear to constitute civil war. Given that deployment of
the UNPROFOR and the UNHCR were the most exhaustive measures the UN
could take at the time, the Security Council’s inability to increase involvement
26

M. Cherif Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports and Data Submitted to the
Commission Between November 3-25, 1992, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 22-3, emphasis
added (Hereafter: Examination and Analysis of Reports).
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prompted the Council to adopt other solutions Bassiouni recommended. For
example, he proposed: “A warning of possible prosecution should be issued by the
United Nations to authorities responsible for violations and human rights
violations.”27 Coupled with his vehement support in establishing an international
criminal court, Bassiouni’s effort was one prominent factor in the formation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on May 25,
1993.28
Another enacted solution of the Security Council originated from a series
of recommendations in the same report based on media coverage:
Establish an investigative commission. […] Establish an information
agency, apart from local authorities, in order to disseminate objective
information and given appropriate radio and television time in Zagreb,
Belgrade and Sarajevo. Systematically collect data and documentation of
war crimes to be used in subsequent prosecutions. Establish a commission
to investigate cases where prosecution may be warranted.29
These propositions were integrated into the overall purpose and direction of the
Commission of Experts. Over the next two years, the IHRLI created a massive
database of the Commission’s findings, and private funding allowed for the

27

Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 23.

28

For more on Bassiouni’s advocacy of an international criminal court, see: M. Cherif Bassiouni,
“The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court.” Indiana International & Comparative
Law Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1-43. Also: M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Need for an
International Criminal Court in the New International World Order,” Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law 25, no. 2 (1992): 151-182. For more on Bassiouni’s integral influence on the
ICTY, see Allcock, Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies, 358.
29

Bassiouni, 1992, Examination and Analysis of Reports, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers, 23-4.
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deployment of thirty-five field missions, which generated an impressive amount of
evidence and material for the ICTY.30 The significance of this particular report by
the Commission is that the members were exposed to a large array of sources on
Yugoslavia, some recapitulating myths, others expressing the urgency of new and
improved involvement.
The Final Report of the Commission of Experts (1994) and its annexes is a
large compilation of writings and research gathered by the members of the
Commission – as such, it presents both unclear descriptions of the conflict as well
as clear, direct statements about genocidal acts. As it states in its introduction, the
Report in its entirety is the result of twelve sessions in which the members
reviewed and edited the text until its final version.31 One of the most integral
notions of the Final Report is the plurality of conflicts taking place throughout the
former Yugoslavia; more often then not, the authors refer to the war as a collection
of separate conflicts and crimes (against humanity) instead of describing it as a
uniform, single war. This would suggest each conflict be addressed individually,
rather than collectively, thereby dividing peacekeeping efforts and ultimately
leading to a selection of conflicts with which to intervene and those with which to

30

In addition to the private funding allocated to the IHRLI, the UN solicited UN member
governments to donate a trust fund supporting the Commission’s operations – approximately
$1,320,600 (USD) was donated, which was made available to the Commission of Experts in the
summer of 1993; Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 9.
31
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standby and monitor. In the section in which the authors discuss the
international/non-international character of the conflict(s), they write:
To date, the major conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia have
occurred in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Determining when
these conflicts are internal and when they are international is a difficult
task because the legally relevant facts are not yet generally agreed upon.
This task is one which must be preformed by the International Tribunal.32
Throughout the Final Report, the authors repeat that each conflict individually
must be scrutinized and if applicable, be addressed by the ICTY, but a process of
scrutiny implies that some conflicts are neither suited for the ICTY nor further
UN involvement. The authors of the report concluded in their case study of
Opština Prijedor, a Bosnian town overtaken by Serbs in the spring of 1992: “It is
unquestionable that the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualify as
crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is unlikely to be confirmed in court
under due process of law that these events constitute genocide.”33 Interestingly,
they imply that the events constitute genocide (or less specifically, “crimes
against humanity”) – but the authors make no mention of the larger body of
conflict scattered about the former Yugoslavia and express doubt that this
particular conflict would be resolved internationally.
The authors of the Final Report addressed this very issue of
categorizing

32

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 13.

33

Ibid., 43.
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individual conflicts in the introductory section of the report:
Classification of the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as
international or non-international depends on important factual and legal
issues. If a conflict is classified as international, then the grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions […] apply as well as violations of the laws and
customs of war. The treaty and customary law applicable to international
armed conflicts is well-established. […] These legal sources do not use the
terms ‘grave breaches’ or ‘war crimes.’ Further, the content of customary
law applicable to internal armed conflict is debatable. As a result, in
general, unless the parties to an internal armed conflict agree otherwise,
the only offenses committed in internal armed conflict for which universal
jurisdiction exists are ‘crimes against humanity’ and genocide, which
apply irrespective of the conflicts’ classification.34
In this passage, the authors reinforce the notion that the UN is dealing with
conflicts and they concede that laws applicable to internal armed conflict are
unresolved questions. This meant that a conflict would first have be scrutinized
and classified as either internal or international, then if the conflict were
international the Security Council still had to ensure its actions were in
accordance with the statutes, protocols, declarations, and principles of the UN.
Additionally, the authors point out the “applicable law” as the Geneva
Conventions as well as several UN protocols. Altogether, these authors
acknowledge that in cases of internal conflict, international intervention cannot be
applied until evidence of genocide is confirmed, thus internal conflicts (or conflict
chosen to be interpreted as such) posed great decisional challenges to the UN
Security Council. Moreover, the author’s statement about crimes against

34

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 13.
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humanity constituting an international conflict contradicts the aforementioned
example of Opština Prijedor, where evidence of crimes against humanity was
present, though the Commission believed it would not be enough to classify the
conflict as genocide in a court of international law.
In the case of international conflict, the UN would have been obligated to
enact many if not all of the solutions proposed by the authors of the Final Report
because the UN relied on its declarations and protocols for legal guidance and
precedence. As the authors wrote: “The Commission also concurs with respect to
the provisions of applicable law contained in the statute of the International
Tribunal. Indeed, in its first interim report (paras. 36-46), the Commission had
taken the position which the Security Council later adopted in Resolution 827
(1993).”35 But, UN involvement throughout the duration of the conflict remained
fairly ineffectual, and the ICTY scarcely prosecuted perpetrators. The website of
the ICTY reports that as of September 2016 – more than two decades since the
ICTY was formed – only 161 individuals have been charged, with only 78
indicted individuals having charges that include sexual violence and
misconduct.36

35

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 71.
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Although the Final Report also provides clear, direct statements about the
war-torn conditions of the former Yugoslavia, these statements appear to not have
had as much weight as the more problematic sections of the Report with regard to
the members of the Security Council. Overall, the Report is unclear about
applicable law in the case of crimes against humanity and internal conflict in
relation to the former Yugoslavia. The dozens of applicable international laws
created by the United Nations had great bearing on the members of the Security
Council when considering the implications of the Final Report. It therefore seems
that the authors (likely unknowingly) provided a type of framework and language
that allowed decisions to be suspended pending litigation of UN statues and
principles, international versus internal, genocide, perpetrators, victims, and
consequences.
Under the subheading of “Collection and analysis of information” within
the Final Report, the Commission of Experts summarize different types of crimes
against humanity and note that the presence of these types of crimes is not
necessarily indicative of genocide. They conclude their summary on types of
crimes with a description that allowed for crimes during a particular conflict
(usually in a city or province, not the entirety of the war) to be viewed as evidence
as crimes against humanity instead of evidence of genocide:
Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations where there exists
an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such, which are preconditions for genocide. Crimes
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against humanity are, however, serious international violations directed
against the protected persons, in contradistinction to a fate befalling them
merely as a side-effect, for example, of a military operation dictated by
military necessity.37
This implies that crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia could be
viewed as independent of crimes of genocidal nature, and furthermore, some
conflicts could be interpreted as internal – fracturing the larger body of conflict
into smaller categories of internal, international, and genocidal conflicts.
Furthermore, the authors provide the similar unclear language in their section
summarizing the widespread nature of the acts, implicitly but ineffectually hinting
at the policy of ethnic cleansing:
Crimes against humanity may also amount to extermination of national,
ethnical, racial, religious, or other groups, whether or not the intent that
makes such crimes punishable as genocide can be proven. […] The scale
and nature of such crimes become of special significance and of concern
to the international community because of the abhorrent character of the
overall policy, the means employed to carry out the policy and the number
of victims in produces.38
In this passage, the authors use the standard definition of genocide, but replace it
with “crimes against humanity.” It appears the authors were interchanging crimes
against humanity and genocide in hopes that if either were further identified
throughout the former Yugoslavia, the UN would increase involvement. However,
given that the authors stated that crimes symptomatic of genocide could instead be
labeled as crimes against humanity – and given the authors’ aforementioned
37

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, emphasis added, 22.

38
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expressed doubt at the likelihood of international recognition of the crimes against
humanity as in the aforementioned example of Opština Prijedor – the authors may
have unknowingly created a paradox in which involvement would be stayed
pending resolution of evidence, categorization, and applicable law.
An important issue related to the laws applicable to the conflicts as
international was the issue of self-determination in the case of the Bosnian Serbs
that insisted they were entitled to secede and form a Greater Serbia. In the Final
Report, the authors frequently dismiss all Bosnian Serb-run administrations and
undermine any potential legitimacy of these Serb rebel republics. In their General
Conclusions section, the authors make clear statements that simultaneously
address the internal vs. international issue, as well as the issue of Bosnian Serb
self-determination. They write that state disintegration is frequently regarded as a
civil conflict, but add that:
[when] the respective States of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina declared their independence, received international
recognition and were admitted to membership in the United Nations, the
conflict with respect to each of these States became an international
conflict […] the precise time at which the different stages of this multiparty conflict became or ceased to be a conflict of an international
character must be determined by a review of legally relevant facts. In the
event the Tribunal concludes that the conflict is of an international
character, the ‘grave breaches’ provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949 shall apply.39

39

Final Report of the Commission of Experts, 70-1; the authors also used quotation marks around
the name of any rebel Serb-founded republic, immediately indicating to the reader the
Commission’s belief in the illegitimacy of these rebel zones.
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The authors were explicitly discounting the legitimacy of the “Serb Republic of
Krajina” and other rebel Serb-founded governments in order to resolve the
paradox created after acceptance of the secessions of Croatia and Bosnia as
legitimate and denial of the seceding (Bosnian) Serbs. Because these republics
were founded almost entirely on the war criminal actions of the Yugoslav
National Army and Serb paramilitary, the authors easily dismissed these states.
Nonetheless, the UN had to consider and fully dismiss the applied principle of
self-determination that these Serb forces claimed before they could assess
individual conflicts as internal or international, and finally, assess further
involvement or not.
Due to the limited space of the Report, the authors appear to have relied a
great deal on their compiled findings that constituted the annexes in order to
explain in greater detail the intricacies of the Commission’s understandings. In the
section titled “Genocide,” the authors make no strong statements supported with
evidence about acts of genocide in the former Yugoslavia – perhaps because most
of the evidence was contained to the annexes. Instead of using one of numerous
examples they had at their disposal, the authors of the Final Report chose to
describe genocide in theoretical ways:
If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as
such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the
Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The case
being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to destroy in
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whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not
belong to the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A.40
Unfortunately, the ICTY did not publish the annexes with the Final Report, nor
were they donated to Special Collections and Archives at DePaul University
where Bassiouni transferred his materials. It is unclear why the annexes were not
published: some likely contained sensitive, confidential, or personally identifiable
information, while others were analyses of all facets of the conflict – including its
alleged past.
Bassiouni does, however, summarize an important annex that delves into
the history of conflicts in an article he published in 1994, the same year the Final
Report was published by the Security Council. In his summary of the
investigations into the region’s history, Bassiouni and the Commission compiled
hundreds of years worth of conflicts in order to demonstrate that the warring
populations of the Third Balkan War have always been at odds with one another:
Annex IV [of the Final Report] pertains to the policy of ethnic cleansing.
This 90-page report contains three sections: first, a history of conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia dating back to the first century A.D.; second, an
analysis of the policy of ethnic cleansing; and, third, a study of the town of
Zvornik […] Since the ethnic rivalries in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia are historically rooted, the first section describes the origins of
the rivalries and the region’s turbulent past in the hope of providing an
understanding of the perspective of the parties involved in the current
conflict.41
40
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A history of conflicts dating back to the first century A.D. was the result of
overzealous research, and it is clear that since the Commission perceived
centuries of conflicts to be connected to the present populations, they ascribed to
an essentialist depiction of Balkans history. By suggesting that the populations
were identical to their progenitors two millennia prior, the Commission was
offering an ahistorical image of cultural preservation over time and unchanging
criterion for the identities of Balkan nations.42 Moreover, by depicting these
nations with a long-standing history of conflict (though untrue), the UN Security
Council encountered difficulty in settling on a more effective solution than their
efforts thus far.43
Though Bassiouni led the Commission of Experts, he was not the only
author to contribute to the Commission’s Final Report. Bassiouni credits two
IHRLI staff attorneys for their contributions on Annex IV, one of these attorneys
being Jan Brakel. While structuring the fourth annex of the Report, Brakel
analyzed the 1986 draft “Memorandum” of the Serbian Academy of Arts and
Sciences (SANU) because of its heightened media attention. Throughout the
1990s, journalists often mislabeled the SANU Memorandum as a blueprint for
42

For more theory on the role of historical antecedents in nationalist movements, see Anthony
Smith, Nationalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).
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Serbian expansion, but scholars have demystified the document’s ideologies vis-àvis Serb nationalist expansion during the war.

44

Brakel identifies a level of

intellectual poverty within the economically focused portion of the Memorandum,
and he also writes in his analysis of the document:
Finding a connection between the Memorandum and subsequent events
may in this instance also betray a common journalistic overestimation of
the power of the written word, as distinct from crediting the account to the
more complex interplay of large forces (social, economic or political),
mass psychology and its symbols, spoken exhortations, inspirational
personalities, and the dynamic of open conflict itself once sparked by the
intractable mix of things contemporary and historical.45
What is particularly significant about Brakel’s review of the SANU Memorandum
is that he critically responds to media sources that claim the Memorandum is a
clear expansionist plan for belligerent Serb nationalists. Yet, Brakel, like
Bassiouni, subscribed to the notion of age-old hatreds. Brakel’s usage of the term
44

As historian Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, the Memorandum’s propositions were largely not
radical: “It does not advocate the redrawing of borders or ethnic cleansing, as has so often been
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instructions for action.” Dragović-Soso, ‘Saviours of the Nation,” 181. A possible explanation for
why news media outlets promulgated the Memorandum as a “blueprint for Serbian expansion”
was the perceived connection between the document as a reaction to the movement for Kosovar
independence and the bloodshed that started in the 1990s. In 1986, a draft Memorandum was
leaked to a Yugoslav regime tabloid, and due to the Memorandum’s Serb nationalist content, the
document set off widespread concern for the future of the Yugoslav federation and its republics.
As Serbian politicians and members of the Belgrade intelligentsia perceived the country’s powerrelations and economics in increasingly Serbocentric terms, Slovenes and Croats distanced their
respective republics and cultural institutions from the federal center. While the document was not
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nationalisms – Serbian, Kosovar, Croatian, and Slovenian – at the federal level, thereby bringing
the country even closer to sociopolitical collapse given its vast economic problems. For more on
the perspective of Croatian intellectuals in relation to Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism, see Tihomir
Cipek, op. cit.; for more on the Slovenian intelligentsia’s perspectives on Serbian hegemony, see
Mitja Velikonja, op. cit.
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“historical” here refers to the Commission’s generalized history of Balkans region
conflicts dating back to the first century AD, further indicating that the associates
to and members of the Commission of Experts conceived of the populations as
essentially different from one another while also simultaneously conceiving the
populations as unchanged for nearly two millennia. Given Brakel’s skepticism
toward media sources, it appears highly likely that Brakel either acceded to
essentialism prior to his work with the Commission or he developed it while
investigating. Regardless, Brakel believed the Yugoslav peoples had long-standing
hatreds for one another, and his research efforts were part of the reports that
informed the United Nations Security Council.
Though it is difficult to determine if Bassiouni held an essentialist
worldview prior to his appointment to the Commission, he certainly continued to
conceive the nations of the former Yugoslavia within the framework of
essentialism for years after the completion of the investigations. While serving as
expert witness to the defense in Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić, Bassiouni was
asked if the commission had looked into the history leading up to the events. He
explained, “It was not part of our investigation. We did not have a mandate to look
into the political evolution, but it was important to understand how things came
about, for us to see how this conflict evolved. […] There has always been in Serbia
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a very strong nationalistic streak.”46 This distortion of historical fact, or at the very
least a significant misreading of history, had unintended disastrous consequences.
In depicting the conflict as both perpetual and as having victims on both
sides, it comes as no surprise that the UN Security Council could not conceive of
more effective intervention efforts; the UN was dealing with a fractured civil war –
a habitual conflict that had always existed and would, perhaps, always exist. To
complicate matters further, the UN honored the self-determination of the Slovenes,
the Croats, and the Bosnians by recognizing the statehood of each of these three
nations. This meant when the rebelling Bosnian Serbs attempted to break away
from newly independent Bosnia and rejoin Serbia, the UN could not honor the
action as one of self-determination. As William Maley succinctly observes: “The
UN was faced in the former Yugoslavia with a conflict not simply between groups,
but between principles – of the sovereignty of states, of self-determination, and, of
human rights. These were all principles which the UN had played a major role in
propagating.”47
Though Cherif Bassiouni and the other members of the Commission of
Experts intended to end the grave violations of human rights in the former
Yugoslavia, their reports paired with the exhausted UNPROFOR and UNHCR
worked against these humanitarian aspirations. In the end, the essentialist portrayal
46

United States District Court, Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzić, The M. Cherif Bassiouni Papers,
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of ancient hatreds, the complications in applying the principle of selfdetermination uniformly, and widespread victimization paralyzed the United
Nations; and under these circumstances, ethnic cleansing and other grave breaches
of international law persisted until military action interrupted the Yugoslav
conflict and slowly ended it through the 1990s.
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